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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 20040324-CA 
v. 
JOSEPH DELEE ATENCIO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals his conviction for one count of burglary, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), in the First Judicial District 
Court, in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court plainly err in not sua sponte directing a verdict of 
acquittal after the jury convicted defendant of burglary and acquitted him of theft? 
Standard of Review: This claim was not preserved below and is therefore 
reviewed for plain error. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). 
Issue 2: Was it objectively unreasonable for defendant's trial counsel not to move 
for a directed verdict after the jury convicted him of burglary and acquitted him of theft 
and, if so, was defendant prejudiced? 
Standard of Review: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the 
first time on appeal is reviewed for correctness. State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,11 13, 
55 P.3d 1131. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes relevant to this appeal include Utah's burglary statute: 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004); and Utah's theft statute: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was arrested on July 30, 2002, and charged by information with 
burglary of a building and theft. R. 1-5. 
On February 19, 2004, following a one-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of 
burglary, but acquitted of theft. R. 186. 
2 
On March 30, 2004, defendant was given a suspended sentence of zero-to-five 
years in the Utah State Prison and ordered to serve 90 days in the Box Elder County Jail. 
He was also placed on 36 months probation and ordered to pay a $950 fine. R. 209-11; 
213-16. 
On April 21, 2004, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 217. 
On May 17, 2004, two days after defendant was released early from jail due to 
overcrowding, he violated his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine. R. 
220-21. Defendant was ordered into custody until a hearing could be scheduled. R. 224. 
On June 7, 2004, defendant admitted to the probation violation and reimposed the 
remainder of defendant's jail sentence and 36 months of probation. R. 235, 238-89. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 12, 1992, Detective Larry Johnston of the Box Elder County Sheriffs 
Department was summoned to International Mill Services ("IMS") in Plymouth, Utah, to 
investigate a burglary. R. 253:63. Upon arrival, he found the office clerk's desk had 
been broken into and a "cash box" containing an estimated $150 had been taken. R. 
253:53, 63. The burglar had broken a window with a broom handle to gain entry. R. 
253:63. 
The burglar left two clues: a single fingerprint discovered on the top drawer of the 
desk, R. 253:76, and a footprint found beneath the broken window on top of a computer 
tower. R. 253:71, 75. While the fingerprint was being evaluated, Detective Johnston 
attempted to discover the brand of shoe that likely made the shoeprint. R. 253:68. He 
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searched through catalogues and visited shoe stores until he finally determined that the 
print was a work boot. R. 253:69. He then checked the soles of the boots of IMS 
employees, but did not find a match. R. 253:77. 
But when the fingerprint came back matching the defendant, all the pieces of the 
puzzle fell into place for investigators. R. 253:78. Detective Johnston obtained a warrant 
to search defendant's residence and retrieved a work boot, the sole of which matched the 
footprint taken from the computer tower. R. 253:74. 
Defendant had worked as a mechanic at IMS from July 2000 to August 2001 when 
he was fired for being absent without calling in sick. R. 253:54, 105. In apparent 
retaliation, defendant filed a complaint with a government agency alleging safety 
violations against IMS. R. 253:107. During the eleven months following his termination, 
defendant had worked steadily for only 11 days and spent the rest of the time doing "odd 
jobs" such as hauling junk. R. 253:108. 
At trial, defendant denied he was the burglar. R. 253:109. He pointed out, 
through direct testimony and cross-examination, that he sometimes worked in the office 
that was broken into and that he often retrieved pens and notebooks from the desk where 
the cash was kept, which would explain the presence of his fingerprint. R. 253:106. He 
also pointed out that the fingerprint was found on the top drawer of the desk, even though 
the cash box was taken from the bottom drawer, which showed no fingerprints. R. 
253:76-77. Additionally, he noted that although the sole of his boot "best" matched the 
shoeprint, there was nothing unique about his boot or the print. R. 253:74-75. Finally, he 
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seemed to claim that he was not the person who filed the safety complaint, although he 
acknowledged that he had been blamed for it. R. 253:107. 
However, the State presented evidence from a fingerprint expert that it was 
virtually impossible for the fingerprint to survive the eleven months between the time 
defendant was fired and the break-in. R. 253:87. The IMS office clerk also testified that 
she cleaned the desk weekly with a cleanser, which the fingerprint expert said would have 
eliminated any existing prints. R. 253:56, 87-88. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court did not err in not sua sponte entering a directed verdict 
when the jury convicted defendant of burglary and acquitted him of theft. First, an 
inconsistent verdict is not grounds for reversal. Second, the verdict is not inconsistent. 
Finally, to the extent that defendant is claiming insufficient evidence, he has not 
marshaled the evidence and, in any event, the evidence was sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction. 
Point II: Because the verdict was not inconsistent, defendant's trial counsel was 
not ineffective in not moving for a directed verdict. Nor was defendant prejudiced. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT 
ENTERING A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Defendant claims the trial court should have sua sponte entered a directed 
verdict of acquittal on all charges after the jury convicted him of burglary, but 
acquitted him of theft. "The inconsistency of these verdicts is glaringly obvious. 
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Under Utah law[,] a burglary requires both an unauthorized entering together with an 
intent to commit theft or other crime." Aplt. Br. at 24. Although this is a correct 
statement of the law, defendant's claim is without merit. 
As a preliminary matter, defendant faces enormous procedural hurdles in making this 
claim because it is, as defendant acknowledges, unpreserved. Claims not raised before the 
trial court generally may not be raised on appeal. State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313,318 (Utah 
1998). Nonetheless, defendant urges this court to consider his claim under the plain error 
doctrine. Unpreserved claims may still be considered on appeal if a defendant can 
demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error." See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 
1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994). To demonstrate 
plain error, a defendant must establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, 
our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
As shown below, defendant cannot meet this burden. 
A, Inconsistency in the Verdicts If Any, Does Not Require Reversal. 
Defendant claims his conviction should be reversed because a verdict convicting 
him of burglary and acquitting him of theft is inconsistent. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 19-25. In 
essence, defendant is claming that the inconsistency necessarily means that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of burglary. However, the numerous courts—including the 
United States and Utah supreme courts—have long recognized that an inconsistent 
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verdict does not require reversal. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1984); 
Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932); State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam). 
In Dunn, the Supreme Court was asked to decide a case in which the defendant, 
charged with three interrelated crimes equally supported by the evidence, argued that his 
conviction by jury for one of those crimes had to be vacated where the same jury 
acquitted him of the other two. Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393 (1932). The Supreme Court 
rejected the claim, stating: 
The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either 
in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real 
conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the 
defendant's guilty. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their 
assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which 
they were disposed through lenity. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court concluded, "That the 
verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is 
possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters." Id. at 
394. 
In Powell, the Supreme Court considered whether the same rule applied where the 
jury convicted the defendant of one crime that incorporated commission of another and 
the jury acquitted defendant of the incorporated crime. Powell, 469 U.S. at 60-61. In that 
case, the defendant was charged with multiple drug crimes, including (1) conspiring to 
possess cocaine with the intent to distribute; (2) possessing a specific quantity of cocaine 
with intent to distribute; and (3) using a telephone to commit the other two crimes. Id. at 
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60. The jury acquitted the defendant of the first two crimes but convicted her of the third. 
Id. On appeal, Powell "argued that the verdicts were inconsistent, and that she therefore 
was entitled to reversal of the telephone facilitation convictions." Id. The circuit court 
agreed with Powell, holding that "the jury's acquittals on the predicate offenses required a 
finding of insufficient evidence on the compound offenses." Id. at 62 n.6. The Supreme 
Court, applying Dunn, reversed: 
[Inconsistent verdicts—even verdicts that acquit on a predicate offense 
while convicting on the compound offense—should not necessarily be 
interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the defendant's expense. It 
is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its 
conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, 
compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser 
offense. But in such situations the Government has no recourse if it wishes 
to correct the jury's error; the Government is precluded from appealing or 
otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy 
Clause... . 
. . . The fact that the inconsistency may be the result of lenity, coupled with 
the Government's inability to invoke review, suggests that inconsistent 
verdicts should not be reviewable. 
Id. at 65-66. 
The Court also rejected "a rule that would allow criminal defendants to challenge 
inconsistent verdicts on the ground that in their case the verdict was not the product of 
lenity, but of some error that worked against them." Id. at 66. "Such an individualized 
assessment would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the 
jury's deliberations that courts generally will not undertake." Id. 
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed defendant's claim "that an acquittal on a 
predicate offense necessitates a finding of insufficient evidence on a compound felony 
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count." Id. at 68. The Court explained that such an argument "simply misunderstands the 
nature of the inconsistent verdict problem": 
Whether presented as an insufficient evidence argument, or as an argument 
that the acquittal on the predicate offense should collaterally estop the 
Government on the compound offense, the argument necessarily assumes 
that the acquittal on the predicate offense was proper—the one the jury 
'really meant.' This, of course, is not necessarily correct; all we know is 
that the verdicts are inconsistent. The Government could just as easily— 
and erroneously—argue that since the jury convicted on the compound 
offense the evidence on the predicate offense must have been sufficient. 
Thus, the Court warned: 
[RJeview of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and 
appellate courts . . . should not be confused with the problems caused by 
inconsistent verdicts. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves 
assessment by the courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could 
support any rational determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt... . 
This review should be independent of the jury's determination that 
evidence on another count was insufficient. 
Id. at 67 (emphasis added). 
In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the principles of Dunn and 
Powell applied in Utah. See State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). In 
Stewart, two co-defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their 
convictions based on the jury's acquittal of two other co-defendants of the crime where 
the evidence of the latters' guilt was strong. Id. at 611. In rejecting the defendants' 
claim, the court concluded that their argument was "premised upon the erroneous 
assumption that the acquittals resulted from a determination by the jury that the evidence 
was necessarily insufficient to find guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Stewart, 729 P.2d 
at 614 (emphasis added). "Such a view is purely speculative," the court held, because 
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"[a] jury's acquittal of a defendant, whether tried separately or jointly with others, may 
also result from some compromise, mistake, or lenity on the jury's part." Id. "'But 
verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.'" Id. at 612 (quoting 
Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932)). 
The court repeated Powell's warning that review of a case for sufficiency of the 
evidence 
'should not be confused with the problems caused by inconsistent verdicts. 
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the courts of 
whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational 
determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt... . This review should 
be independent of the jury's determination that evidence on another count 
was insufficient.' 
Id. at 613 (on rehearing) (quoting Powell, 469 U.S. at 67); see also State v. Hancock, 874 
P.2d 132, 134 (Utah App. 1994) ("In Utah, 'it is generally accepted that the inconsistency 
of verdicts is not, by itself, sufficient ground to set the verdicts aside.'") (quoting Stewart, 
729P.2dat613). 
In this case, defendant assumes that the jury could not simultaneously acquit him 
of theft and convict him of burglary. Under Stewart, that is an "erroneous assumption." 
Stewart, 729 P.2d at 614. In fact, the jury could have acquitted defendant of theft by 
mistake or for reasons of lenity and still convicted him of burglary based on that same 
evidence. See id.; Powell, 469 U.S. at 64-69; Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393-94. Defendant does 
not recognize this possibility. Thus, he fails to marshal any of the evidence supporting his 
conviction and, thus, is precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. See, 
e.g., State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, \ 12, 108 P.3d 710 ("We have repeatedly warned of the 
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risks assumed by an appellant who fails to marshal evidence because '[w]hen an appellant 
fails to meet the heavy burden of marshaling the evidence, appellate courts are bound to 
assume the record supports the trial court's factual findings'") (citing Justice Michael J. 
Wilkins et al., Utah Appellate Practice, 2000 Utah L.Rev. 1115 128 (2000) (additional 
citation omitted)). Defendant therefore neither shows that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the jury's verdict or that "the sufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that 
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f^ 
17,10 P.3d 346. 
In support of his claim that the verdicts are inconsistent, defendant cites State v. 
Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App. 1994). Although on point, this case actually 
undercuts defendant's claim. Hancock was convicted of aggravated sexual assault along 
with a co-defendant, Gressman. The jury acquitted Gressman of a separate charge of rape. 
Hancock claimed these verdicts were inconsistent because the sexual assault consisted of the 
alleged rape; thus, according to Hancock, if there was no rape, there could be no sexual 
assault. This Court had no difficulty disposing of this argument: 
Aggravated sexual assault encompasses a broader scope of criminal conduct 
than rape, and it includes attempted criminal conduct. In other words, rape is 
not a predicate felony for aggravated sexual assault because the two crimes 
require proof of different elements. Hancock's conviction for aggravated 
sexual assault is conditioned neither on his being convicted for rape or 
attempted rape, nor on Gressman being convicted of rape or attempted rape. 
Id 
Similarly, here, defendant seems to want to argue that if there was no theft, then 
there could be no burglary. This is incorrect. Theft is not a predicate felony for burglary 
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"because the two crimes require proof of different elements." Id. Thus, the jury's verdict 
convicting defendant of burglary, but acquitting him of theft was perfectly consistent. 
B. The Verdict was not Inconsistent. 
Defendant's claim also fails because there is no inconsistency in the verdict. In 
Utah, the elements of burglary of a building are: (1) entering or remaining unlawfully in a 
building or any portion thereof; and (2) an intent to commit theft or any other felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(l)(b) (West 2004). Thus, defendant's claim that the verdict 
is inconsistent fails because burglary need not involve actual theft; rather burglary may be 
committed by entering or remaining unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit theft. Moreover, according to the Utah Supreme Court, 
"[b]urglarious intent 'is a mental state of the actor. [T]he trier of fact must resort to 
reasonable inferences based upon [an] examination of the surrounding circumstances to 
reasonably infer its existence.'" State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (citing 
Farno v. State, 308 N.E.2d 724, 725 (1974)). Under Utah law, intent to steal may be 
fairly inferred from unlawful entry. "Where the breaking and entering are clearly 
established and not controverted, the intent to steal may be sufficiently established by 
inference fairly deducible from all the circumstances and need not be established by direct 
proof." Id} 
At trial, jurors were presented essentially two items of evidence implicating 
1
 Additionally, under the statute, the intended crime need not be theft. Jurors were 
instructed to find defendant guilty of burglary if they determined that he broke into IMS 
with the intent to commit theft or any other felony. See R. 168 (burglary instruction). 
12 
defendant: The fingerprint on the desk and the shoeprint on top of the computer near the 
broken window. R. 71-76. Jurors knew that defendant had previously worked at IMS and 
that he would have had legitimate reasons to be at the desk and leave fingerprints. They also 
knew that the fingerprint was found on the top drawer of the desk, even though the cash box 
was taken from the bottom drawer, which showed no fingerprints. R. 253:76-77. Thus, 
jurors may well have had reasonable doubt about whether defendant aobtain[ed] or 
exercise[d] unauthorized control" over the cash box and, accordingly, whether he had 
committed theft. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004) (theft). The burglary count, 
on the other hand, was supported by the fact that the soles of defendant's boots were 
consistent with the shoeprint found on the computer directly beneath the window that had 
been broken by the burglar to gain entry. R. 253:71, 74-75. No testimony explained why 
defendant's shoeprint would be on the computer beneath the window if he were innocent. 
Based on this evidence, jurors may have found that defendant entered the building with the 
intent to commit theft or some other felony, but found the evidence insufficient to 
demonstrate that he had succeeded. 
II. DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE 
FOR NOT MOVING FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not "mov[ing] for a directed 
verdict after the State failed to establish a prima facie case that the defendant committed 
the alleged acts [burglary] beyond a reasonable doubt." Aplt. Br. at 16. This claim is 
meritless. 
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"In determining whether a criminal defendant has been denied effective assistance 
of counsel, this court adheres to the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 . . . (1984)." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, \ 23, 84 P.3d 1183. The familiar test 
requires a defendant to demonstrate "(1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to 
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the [proceedings] would 
have been different." Id. (quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, «| 19, 61 P.3d 978) 
(additional quotations and citations omitted)). 
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, defendant must demonstrate his 
trial counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Id.; accord Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah), cert, denied, 115 
S. Ct. 431 (1994); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). To establish that 
such serious errors occurred, a defendant must identify counsel's specific acts or 
omissions that 'fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.'" State 
v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 532 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). "Proof of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 
1162 (Utah App. 1998). 
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The court will not second-guess counsels' legitimate strategic choices, regardless 
of how flawed those choices might appear in retrospect. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
Defendant must therefore overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's 
performance fell "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id; see 
also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993), and State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 
(Utah 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). 
Furthermore, it is not enough to show that counsel's performance could have been 
better. The Sixth Amendment entitles defendant "only to effective assistance of counsel, 
not to a right to the best or most complete representation available." State v. Tyler, 850 
P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993); see also Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(the court may find counsel's performance constitutionally deficient only if petitioner 
establishes that counsel's performance was "completely unreasonable, not merely 
wrong"). 
In order to satisfy the second, or prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, 
defendant must show that he was actually prejudiced by any alleged unreasonableness. 
To meet this criterion, defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability 
that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. The courts have defined a 
reasonable probability as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
reliability of the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
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To succeed in his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet 
both prongs of the Strickland test. Defendant meets neither prong. Trial counsel's 
performance did not fall below an "objective standard of reasonableness" because, as 
demonstrated in section I., above, there was no basis for entering a directed verdict. 
Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at % 23. Trial counsel cannot be faulted for not making a futile 
objection. State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, % 34, 989 P.2d 52. And because the objection 
would have been futile, there is not a "reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
[proceedings] would have been different." Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at \ 23. Accordingly, 
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of June 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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